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INTRODUCTION
The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) changed the substantive
provisions that defined Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), a
type of immigration benefit for children.1 One of the changes,
concerning a court predicate finding that the child’s “reunification
with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law” was
generally agreed to mean that reunification was not viable when the
child suffered such mistreatment from at least one parent, and not
necessarily from both.2 In 2012, however, the Nebraska Supreme
Court espoused a different interpretation of the provision, supporting
its view by consulting interpretative canons, vertical legislative
history, and administrative decisions.3 Other high and appellate level
courts have declined to follow the Nebraska decision, but this
decision is not an outlier.4 In 2014, the New Jersey Superior Court
agreed with the Nebraska Supreme Court and reinforced support for
the interpretation with direct quotations from the TVPRA
Congressional records.5 The narrow interpretation propounded by
Nebraska and New Jersey has the alarming potential to foreclose
relief for many children seeking SIJS.6

1. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008)(codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
2. See, e.g., In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 6097225, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); In re
Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012); Brief for Appellant at 8, In re
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Neb. 2012) (No. S-11-000919), 2012 WL 10785183;
DEBORAH LEE ET AL., UPDATE ON LEGAL RELIEF OPTIONS FOR UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILDREN FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008 (2009),
available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/235_tvpra_practice_advisory.infonet.pdf; Jared
Ryan Anderson, Comment, Yearning to be Free: Advancing the Rights of

Undocumented Children Through the Improvement of the Special Immigrant
Juvenile (SIJ) Status Procedure, 16 SCHOLAR 659, 672 (2014) (“In 2011, out of
1,062,040 immigrants obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained
legal status through SIJS.”); Jennifer Baum et al., Most In Need but Least Served:

Legal and Practical Barriers to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for Federally
Detained Minors, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 621, 622 (2012); Megan Johnson & Kele Stewart,
Unequal Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: State Court Adjudication of
One-Parent Cases, A.B.A. (July 14, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/childrights/content/articles/summer2014-0714-unequal-access-specialimmigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-adjudication-one-parent-cases.html.
3. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639 (Neb. 2012).
4. See, e.g., In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
5. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
6. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
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Since 2012, the United States government has anticipated an
increasing number of unaccompanied immigrant children arriving in
the United States.7 The increase in unaccompanied immigrant
children also means a corresponding increase in the amount of
potentially SIJS-eligible children.8 Consequently, state court judges,
as well as family and immigration law attorneys, will increasingly
confront the question of who is or is not eligible for SIJS. Some states
that will receive incoming unaccompanied children have not
addressed the questions behind a SIJS petition for predicate findings
in the past. Thus, judges and attorneys will likely find themselves
with little guidance on the issue from higher courts within their
respective states.
This Note argues that the provision in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) that requires a court to find that “reunification
with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law” is
satisfied when a child suffered this type of mistreatment from at least
one parent.9 Part I provides background information on SIJS
generally. It also discusses a history of the provisions for SIJS
eligibility in the INA from its codification in 1990 and its major
revisions in 1997 and 2008. Part II examines the conflict between
states in their interpretations of the plain meaning, intent, and
legislative history of the provisions. Part II also introduces and
analyzes the decisions by three prominent states that have spoken
directly to the issue of interpretation—New York, New Jersey, and
Nebraska. Part III advocates for the adoption of the New York
interpretation of the SIJS provisions in the INA, which states that
reunification is not viable when the child suffered mistreatment from
at least one parent, and not necessarily from both. Part III
demonstrates that the New York interpretation best reflects the plain
meaning and the legislative intent of the INA provision. Part III also

7. In fiscal year 2009, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, after referral by the
Department of Homeland Security, admitted 6092 children. The number in fiscal
year 2010 was 8207. OLGA BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE
FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A
RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICY MAKERS, AND RESEARCHERS 10 (2012),
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-ofunaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf.
A congressional
report showed the increase from fiscal year 2012 to 2014. LISA SEGHETTI ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN
OVERVIEW 2 fig.1 (2014).
8. See infra Part I.E.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012).
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discusses why policy considerations favor the adoption of the New
York interpretation.
I. THE EVOLVING LANGUAGE OF THE SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
JUVENILE STATUS PROVISIONS IN THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT
Part I of this Note provides background information on the
evolution of the SIJS provisions in 1990, 1997, and 2008. It also
discusses SIJS generally and recent trends in child migration. Part I.A
explains the meaning of SIJS and the criteria required to qualify for
SIJS. Parts I.B, I.C, and I.D explain the SIJS provisions in 1990, 1997,
and 2008, respectively, as well as the history behind the provisions
and amendments. Finally, Part I.E discusses the increase of migration
that began since 2011.
A. What Is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and What Are Its
Criteria?
SIJS is a type of special immigrant status that allows a defined set
of eligible persons to obtain lawful permanent residence.10 The INA
generally enables the federal government to grant a particular status
to a certain amount of “special immigrants.”11 Several other “special
immigrant” statuses are detailed under different sections of the
INA.12 SIJS allows a recipient to immediately apply for lawful
permanent residence based on a state court’s predicate factual
findings,13 and provides the successful applicant with the opportunity
to obtain United States citizenship after five years of lawful
permanent residence.14 Congress introduced SIJS at the enactment of

10. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTIVE 11-OCFS-ADM-01, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) 2–3
(Feb.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/
external/OCFS_2011/ADMs/11-OCFS-ADM-01%20Special%20Immigrant%20
Juvenile%20Status%20%28SIJS%29.pdf.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (2012). “Special immigrants” are listed under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27) and include certain eligible Panamanian nationals under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(E), former citizens who may apply for reacquisition of membership
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(B), and immigrants who serve the Armed Forces of the
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(K).
12. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., Introduction and Overview to Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status, in SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS FOR CHILDREN
AND YOUTH UNDER COURT JURISDICTION 3-1 (2010), available at http://www.ilrc.org/
files/2010_sijs-chapter_03-sijs_overview.pdf.
13. See e.g., In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
14. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 3. The
applicant, however, is unable to confer immigration status on his or her parents. 8
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the federal Immigration Act of 1990 in order to address problems that
undocumented immigrant children often encountered in the state
foster care system.15 These obstacles included the possibility of
deportation, poverty, language barriers, lack of health care or health
insurance, and the lack of access to public benefits.16 Further,
unaccompanied immigrant children are generally vulnerable to harm,
such as child trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation, drugs, and
gangs.17 Lawful permanent residence in the United States allows the
SIJS recipient to work legally, obtain financial aid for college, and be
eligible for limited public benefits.18 Since enacting SIJS in 1990,
Congress redefined it in 199719 and then further amended it in 2008.20
As of 2008, for a person to be eligible for SIJ status and have a chance
to apply for lawful permanent residence, the person must meet the
following three criteria.21
The first criterion is met based on the person’s involvement in
some form of juvenile court proceeding, such as a guardianship or
delinquency proceeding.22 In other words, a person “who has been
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States
or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or
entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United
States” meets the first criterion for SIJS eligibility.23 For example, a
person may become “dependent on a juvenile court” because a court

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (“[N]o natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any
alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by
virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this
chapter.”); see also Maura M. Ooi, Note, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean
Unprotected: The Inadequacies of Relief for Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 890 (2011).
15. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Wendi J. Adelson, The Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (2008).
18. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 890 (explaining the process by which special status
paves the way for citizenship).
19. See Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2469
(1997).
20. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
22. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-4.
23. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 3.
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appoints her aunt as her legal guardian or because she was placed in
delinquency proceedings and charged with car theft.24
For a person to meet the second criterion (known as the “NonReunification Finding”), a court must issue a finding that
“reunification with one or both of the parents is not viable due to
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
law.”25 Full termination of parental rights is not required to meet the
“non-reunification” criterion.26 The separation from a parent must be
significant enough that a court would consider it unlikely that
reunification is possible.27 For example, a person may meet the nonreunification requirement if his or her parents relinquished their
parental rights.28 Another example is a person who has suffered
abuse by a parent and was placed in long-term foster care as a result.29
The SIJS order should clearly indicate that reunification is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the child, as opposed to
some other dissimilar reason.30
The third criterion requires the SIJS applicant to prove that it is
not in his best interest to return to his country of origin or last
habitual residence.31 The same court that signs off on the first and
second criteria may also include this third criterion.32 The juvenile
court judge would need to sign an order certifying that the above
findings are true.33 Alternatively, evidence for this criterion may
come from other administrative or judicial proceedings.34 In addition
to the three main criteria, there is a consent requirement with a
limited purpose.35 Moreover, a person must be a “child” under the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-4.
Id. at 3-3.
See id. at 3-4.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 3-5.
See id. at 3-6.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012).
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-7.
See id.
See id.

As described by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center:
There are two requirements of consent under the SIJS law: (1) consent to
the grant of SIJS in any case; and (2) specific consent for a juvenile court
determination on a child’s custody or placement status if the child is in
federal custody during removal (deportation) proceedings.
The first type of consent requires that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, through the CIS District Director, must consent to the grant of
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. This consent is an acknowledgement
that SIJS was not “sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status
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INA, which is defined as someone who is under 21 years old and not
married.36
Although the other parts of SIJS merit their own discussion, this
Note will focus on the Non-Reunification Finding. To make factual
determinations pursuant to the SIJS provisions, state courts must
interpret the meaning of the rest of the federal provision that directs
them to make such findings.37 States have produced two opposing
interpretations of the phrase “reunification with one or both of the
[applicant’s] parents is not viable,” and such divergence affects what
the state courts consider to be a type of case that satisfies the NonReunification Finding.38 The first interpretation, known as the “oneparent SIJS” interpretation, allows a child to qualify for SIJS even
when the child remains with or is actively pursuing reunification with
one parent but not the other.39 A second interpretation considers the
Non-Reunification Finding to mean generally that the child must not
viably reunify with both parents.40 Under the second interpretation,
the court may find that the applicant child cannot viably reunify with
one parent only when it would be impossible to make the same
determination for both parents.41

of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.” CIS
conflates consent with the act of approving an SIJS petition and, therefore,
there is no separate consent application that needs to be made. An
approval of an SIJ application itself is evidence of this consent.
The second type of consent is rarer. It applies only to children in federal
custody who seek a juvenile court determination of their custody status or
placement. Children in federal custody who are deemed “unaccompanied”
will be under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), Division of
Unaccompanied Children Services (DUCS) (herein after referred to as
ORR). As such, children in federal custody seeking a juvenile court
determination on their custody or placement status must first obtain
“specific consent” from ORR. This is a notable change. Prior to the
TVPRA, the specific consent had to be obtained from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which had policies and practices toward
unaccompanied minors that were confusing, inconsistent, and detrimental
for these youth.
Id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (citations omitted).
36. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) (2014).
37. See id.
38. Compare In re Marisol N.H., 979 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014),
with In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 646–47 (Neb. 2012).
39. LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3–4; see also Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
40. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 646–47.
41. Id.
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Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 1990

The 1990 provisions define a SIJS-eligible person as:
[A]n immigrant (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile
court located in the United States and has been deemed eligible by
that court for long-term foster care, and (ii) for whom it has been
determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would
not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or
parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual
residence . . . .42

For a person to be eligible for SIJS in 1990, he would need to be
involved in some juvenile court proceeding and also show proof that
it is not in his best interest to return to the country of origin or
previous habitual residence.43 Notably, the language of the NonReunification Finding is different from the current 2008 language.44
In 1990, a court had to deem a person eligible for long-term foster
care.45 This meant, at a minimum, that persons currently in long-term
foster care were eligible, but also contemplated that persons could be
“deemed eligible,” by a court determination.46
In 1990, the SIJS statute passed with little controversy, and there
was little discussion specific to the provision in the congressional
record.47 Some sources suggest that, after the expiration of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, growing complaints
that court-dependent juveniles had no avenue to regularize their
immigration status motivated the enactment of the 1990 SIJS
provision.48 Scholars report that social services agencies in California
specifically advocated for immigration law to fill gaps that prevented

42. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 4978. The
incorporation of the “best interests of the child” findings requirement in SIJS was a
progressive inclusion, given the absence of such a best interests of the child standard
in immigration law. See Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the
Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 120, 124–25 (2009) (explaining that the United States developed the best interests
of the child standard in family law proceedings to protect the needs and wishes of the
child, but that it did not incorporate the same standard in immigration law).
43. See supra Part I.A.
44. See supra Part I.A.
45. Immigration Act § 153.
46. LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
47. See Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A “Juvenile”
Here is not a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 507
(2013).
48. See Katherine Porter, Note, In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of
the 1997 Amendment to Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 443
(2001).

DEFENDING ONE-PARENT SIJS

2015]

929

certain children, with whom the social workers worked, from
regularizing their status.49 The gap-filling function of SIJS was
particularly relevant for such children to be able obtain lawful
permanent resident status and naturalize.50 A regulation by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), under 58 Fed. Reg.
42843, recorded the understanding of the law’s gap-filling effect at the
time: “This rule alleviates hardships experienced by some dependents
of the United States juvenile courts by providing qualified aliens with
the opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and
lawful permanent resident status, with the possibility of becoming
citizens of the United States.”51
C.

Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 1997

The 1997 version of SIJS defined a SIJS-eligible person as:
[A]n immigrant who is present in the United States (i) who has been
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States
or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the
custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been
deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment; (ii) for whom it has been determined in
administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the
alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and (iii)
in whose case the Attorney General expressly consent to the
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special
immigrant juvenile status . . . .52

Notably, the 1997 amendment added: (1) a requirement that the
applicant child, who was dependent on juvenile court, acquire consent
from the INS, and (2) the requirement that the applicant be “eligible
for long-term foster care” needed to be specifically “due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment.”53
Congressional documents suggest that the motivation to clarify the
SIJS beneficiaries to limit abuse and clarify jurisdiction concerns
influenced such changes.54 First, the 1997 House Conference Report
49. See, e.g., Kirsten Jackson, Special Status Seekers: Through the Underused
SIJS Process, Immigrant Juvenile May Obtain Legal Status, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at
20, 20–22, available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol34No11/2893.pdf.
50. See Adelson, supra note 17.
51. 58 Fed. Reg. 42843 (Aug. 12, 1993).
52. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2469 (1997)
(emphasis added).
53. See Porter, supra note 48, at 442.
54. See id. at 448.
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explained that Congress changed the requirements in order to “limit
the beneficiaries of this [SIJS] provision to those juveniles for whom it
was created namely abandoned, neglected, or abused children.”55
Senator Pete Domenici spearheaded the 1997 changes because he
identified some instances of students who he claimed had fraudulently
obtained SIJS status, where the students did not experience abuse,
neglect, or abandonment.56 In practice, the consent requirement
addressed both the concern about determining the role of the federal
and state governments in the SIJS process57 and the concern over
fraudulent claims by SIJS applicants who did not suffer abuse,
neglect, or abandonment.58 The understanding by 1993 was that SIJS
was a form of relief only for the benefit of abused, neglected, or
abandoned children.
The 1997 amendment clarified this
understanding by adding the requirement that eligibility for long-term
foster care be specifically due to abuse, neglect, and abandonment.59
The amendments to SIJS may have also been a result of litigation
challenging juvenile court jurisdiction over children in deportation
proceedings.60
D. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 2008
After 2008, the TVPRA, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27),
provides that:
[A]n immigrant who is present in the United States—(i) who has
been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed
under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an

individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in
the United States, and whose reunification with one or both of the
immigrants’ parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; (ii) for
whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial
proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be
returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or
country of last habitual residence; and (iii) in whose case the

55. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1006 n.160
(2002).
56. See Porter, supra note 48, at 448.
57. See id. at 447–49.
58. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 907.
59. See Porter, supra note 48, at 444 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)).
60. See id. at 441–42.
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Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special
immigrant juvenile status . . . .61
The TVPRA made procedural and substantive changes to many
forms of immigration legal relief, including changes to SIJS.62 Most
critically, the TVPRA eliminated the language “the juvenile is eligible
for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”63
Federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, enacted before the 2008
changes, stated that the meaning of the phrase “eligible for long-term
foster care” was that “family reunification is no longer a viable
option” for the applicant.64 The regulation, however, did not help to
alleviate the confusion because “family reunification” was equally
undefined. Thus, only children in foster care were surely eligible for
SIJS.65 Consequently, Congress declined to adopt the exact language
of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 in passing the TVPRA.66 Instead, Congress
replaced the entire provision with new language that required a
factual finding that a SIJS applicant’s “reunification with 1 or both of
the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”67 The
TVPRA also significantly improved the language from “family
reunification” in the federal regulation to specifying that it must be
either “1 or both of the immigrant’s parents.”68 The TVPRA also
added the phrase “or a similar basis found under State law,” instead
of keeping the three bases originally listed—“due to abuse, neglect, or

61. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
62. See LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The language of the federal code of regulations differs from the enacted
provisions in TVPRA 2008. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2014), with 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J) (2014]2).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).
68. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), with 8 C.F.R. §204.11(a). Moreover,
the TVPRA used the phrase “not viable,” which does not imply the same inquiry into
the past arrangement of the family as using the phrase “no longer a viable option.”
The phrase “no longer” grammatically implies that a state existed in the past that is
different from the current state described. For example, one would say, “it was
snowing before, but it is no longer snowing now.” The phrase “no longer” would be
grammatically incorrect if the state of existence were the same for the past and the
present. For example, it would not make sense to say, “it was not snowing before,
but it is no longer snowing now.” One would simply say, “it is not snowing.” The use
of the phrase “is not viable” in the TVPRA suggests that courts do not need to
inquire about the past viability of family reunification.
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abandonment.”69 The provision did not track the regulation’s
language, which suggests that courts may consider a more expansive
interpretation of SIJS than what the agency conceived.70
The TVPRA also codified part of a system implemented by the
INS and its successors in the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement
(the “Agreement”) in 1997,71 through the adoption of some provisions
of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act in 2003.72 The
events surrounding the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement
occurred almost parallel to the creation of SIJS in 1990.73 In the leadup to the creation of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement,
child advocates sued the INS in 1990, alleging the mistreatment of
unaccompanied immigrant children in immigration detention
facilities.74 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the INS, but the class
of plaintiff children later reached a settlement agreement with the
agency that gave unaccompanied immigrant children rights related to
detention, transfer, and release.75 The Stipulated Flores Settlement
Agreement created a three-pronged framework for the treatment of
First, the
child migrants in immigration detention centers.76
Agreement provided for rights and services to children under
detention conditions, including services relating to legal assistance;
adequate medical, dental, reproductive, and mental health; and rights
relating to education, recreation, privacy, adequate interpretation,
and the freedoms of religion and expression.77
Second, the
Agreement provided for the right to prompt family reunification

69. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).
70. See LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
71. Carla L. Reyes, Gender, Law, and Detention Policy: Unexpected Effects on
the Most Vulnerable Immigrants, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 309–10 (2010).
72. In 2003, before the TVPRA, the Homeland Security Act took provisions from
the proposed Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act and transferred the
responsibility under the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement from INS to the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).
ORR extended the “best interests of the child” rationale to considerations of the
treatment, transfer, and detention of unaccompanied immigrant children. See id. at
310. The rest of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act reintroduced more
provisions later. See 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
73. See Reyes, supra note 71, at 309.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 310.
77. Id.
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whenever possible.78 Third, the Agreement provided for the right to
detention in the least restrictive detention setting possible.79
The TVPRA came with little legislative history that spoke directly
to the meaning of the SIJS provisions, but a component of TVPRA
may provide some insight.80 Senator Dianne Feinstein, author of the
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2000, remarked during
the passage of TVPRA on its changes that incorporated some aspects
of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement, which would give
better procedural guarantees for unaccompanied children and
prevent bad detention conditions.81 However, Senator Feinstein did
not mention the inclusion of the changed SIJS provisions at that time.
82

In 2008, the TVPRA also codified changes to SIJS in response to
the adoption of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act.83
The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act included a section
on SIJS,84 and Senator Feinstein has been reintroducing the Act since
2000.85 In her 2001 introduction, Senator Feinstein emphasized that
the bill’s intent was to improve procedural protections for
unaccompanied immigrant children and also to “improve
unaccompanied aliens’ access to existing options for permanent
protection . . . .”86 Senator Feinstein emphasized the same intention
in 2007 by stating that the Act “provides no new immigration benefit
to unaccompanied alien children” by using the available benefits
within current immigration law.87 These new SIJS provisions aimed to
“streamline[] the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program.”88

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-5; see also H.S.P. v.
J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 265–67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
81. See 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
82. See id.
83. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
84. Section 341 of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2002
entitled “Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa.” See 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed.
May 2, 2002).
85. See 146 CONG. REC. S9381-05 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
86. 147 CONG. REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein).
87. 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein).
88. See id.
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The legislators struggled to streamline the language of the SIJS
statute to improve access for those who suffered abuse, neglect, or
abandonment.89 Over time, Senator Feinstein made many changes to
the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status section of the Unaccompanied
Alien Child Protection Act.90 First, the 2002 provision for the NonReunification Finding expanded abuse, neglect, and abandonment to
“[those] deemed eligible by [a] court for long-term foster care due to
abuse, neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis found under State
law.”91 Then, in 2004, the proposed Act entirely removed the
language on eligibility for foster care.92 Eventually, in May of 2007,
the Non-Reunification Finding read that the applicant “should not be
reunified with his or her parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment
or similar basis found under State law.”93 The provision’s language is
almost identical to the language as it was passed, except for the “one
or both” phrase which was added in 2008: “[W]hose reunification with
one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”94
The trend of the changes suggests three things: (1) the goal was to
improve access to current immigration benefits, such as SIJS, instead
of creating new ones; (2) the authors thought about and changed the
language on eligibility for foster care multiple times; and (3) the
authors expressly ruled out using language that would limit the
inquiry to abuse, neglect, and abandonment by two parents.
Moreover, the language of the Non-Reunification Finding saw
constant expansion without modification from its first iteration in
2002.95 The unchallenged expansion of the Non-Reunification
Finding suggests that legislators did not look to these particular

89. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1006 n.160.
90. See 154 CONG. REC. H10888-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008); 153 CONG. REC.
S6408-03 (daily ed. May 21, 2007); 150 CONG. REC. S11251-03 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
2004); 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002).
91. 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002) (emphasis added).
92. The proposed Act provides:
(i) who by a court order . . . was declared dependent on a juvenile court
located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to,
or placed under the custody of, a department or agency of a State, or an
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the
United States, due to abuse neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis

found under State law.
150 CONG. REC. S11251-03 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (emphasis added).
93. 153 CONG. REC. S6408-03 (daily ed. May 21, 2007) (emphasis added).
94. 154 CONG. REC. H10888-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (emphasis added).
95. See 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002).
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provisions to address the concern that it “would encourage illegal
immigration and immigration fraud.”96
E.

Recent Trends in Child Migration

Since 2008, courts have had to confront the question of whether or
not a one-parent SIJS applicant can meet the Non-Reunification
Finding.97
Despite fears that SIJS “would encourage illegal
immigration and immigration fraud”98 the reality is that, as recently as
2011, the number of SIJS beneficiaries remained low, despite the
expansions and clarifications in the law.99 In 2010, the Division of
Unaccompanied Children’s Services (DUCS) Legal Access Project
Providers reported that 22.8% of the children they screened were
eligible for SIJS, with the raw number equaling 1604.100
In
comparison, one record of the actual number of SIJS recipients in
that year, which would include a total of many more children than the
DUCS sample, was 1492.101 In fiscal year 2014, Customs and Border
Patrol apprehended 68,541 unaccompanied immigrant children,
representing a 77% increase from the figure in fiscal year 2013.102 If
around 20% are eligible based on DUCS data, then, extrapolating
from that data, 13,708 children could potentially be eligible for SIJS.
Many would potentially receive no relief and be sent back to places
where they would be vulnerable and in danger.

96. 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
97. Compare In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645–47 (Neb. 2012) and H.S.P. v.
J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), with In re Marcelina M.-G.,
973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
98. 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2941.
99. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672 ((“In 2011, out of 1,062,040 immigrants
obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained legal status through
SIJS.”); see also Jackson, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that in 2010, 1492 gained lawful
permanent residence through SIJS, compared to the 1,042,625 people that acquired
lawful permanent residence).
100. Byrne & Miller, supra note 7, at 25 fig.10.
101. Jackson, supra note 49, at 22.
102. Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompaniedchildren (last viewed May 19, 2015).
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II. NEBRASKA, NEW YORK, AND NEW JERSEY COURTS
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE “1 OR BOTH” LANGUAGE
The legislative history of the TVPRA does not articulate whether
or not it is in favor of allowing one-parent SIJS.103 Since 2008, states
have differed in their interpretations of the Non-Reunification
Finding’s language and the meaning of “1 or both.”104 Part II of this
Note analyzes in particular the two opinions from the New Jersey and
Nebraska courts that have diverged from the common understanding
of the Non-Reunification Finding in chronological order. Part II
begins by analyzing the Nebraska case, which introduced the
alternative interpretation of the “1 or both” language and introduced
the controversy in the Non-Reunification Finding. Part II then
discusses a case in New York that represents the common
understanding of the provision. Finally, this Part discusses the New
Jersey case, which revived the alternative interpretation promoted in
Nebraska and added novel reasoning in support of that provision.
A. In re Erick M.—Nebraska
This decision was the first highest-level state court to directly
address the interpretation of the “1 or both” language enacted in
2008. In 2012, the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County
committed Erick M. to the care and custody of the Nebraska Office of
Juvenile Services (OJS) for two charges of a minor in possession of
alcohol.105 Later, Erick requested the juvenile court to issue SIJS
findings.106 The juvenile court heard Erick’s motion for SIJS findings,
but denied the motion after finding that Erick did not meet the NonReunification Finding,107 which requires that the court find that
“reunification with 1 or both of the immigrants’ parents is not viable
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under
State law.”108 Erick’s mother testified that she had not been accused
of Erick’s abuse, neglect, or abandonment.109 The family permanency
specialist assigned to the case also testified that she had no contact
information for Erick’s father and was unsure if the father was in New

103. See supra Part I.D.
104. Compare In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Neb. 2012), and H.S.P. v. J.K.,
87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), with In re Marcelina M.-G., 973
N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
105. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642.
106. Id. at 641.
107. Id. at 643.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i) (2012).
109. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 643.
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York or Mexico.110 Furthermore, the specialist added that she would
continue to work with Erick’s mother, with whom Erick had lived
before he was committed to OJS custody.111 The juvenile court
determined that there was no evidence to show that Erick’s father
abused, neglected, or abandoned him.112 Erick appealed the denial of
SIJS findings.113
The Nebraska Supreme Court identified that Erick M.’s appeal
relied on the interpretation of the SIJS provision that requires a
finding that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is
not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”114 In
evaluating the this provision’s interpretation, the court took a “soft”
plain meaning approach115 to the question of statutory interpretation,
proposing to look strictly at the legislation’s text unless the plain
meaning was unambiguous.116 The court defined an “ambiguous
statute” as one that is “susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation.”117 The court then concluded that it was reasonable to
interpret the provision as disjunctive because of the use of “or.”118
The court ultimately held, however, that Erick’s construction
described one reasonable interpretation, but another reasonable
interpretation could be that the “or” separates two different
independent instructions for the court to follow based on the
circumstances.119 The court did not specify, however, what it meant
by a “reasonable interpretation.”
After finding that the phrase’s meaning was still ambiguous, the
court then analyzed the legislative history of SIJS.120 The court
acknowledged that the 2008 amendments expanded the eligibility
requirements for SIJS.121 In terms of the Non-Reunification Finding,
the court articulated that the 1990 SIJS provisions required only that

110. Id. at 642.
111. Id. at 642–43.
112. Id. at 643.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. With the soft plain meaning approach, the courts introduce additional
considerations to aid them in determining the presumed intent of the legislators,
which is evidenced solely by the words of the statute. See Ron Beal, The Art of
Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 370–71 (2012).
116. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644.
117. Id.
118. The government argued that, under Erick’s construction, the phrase “or both”
would be superfluous but not unreasonable. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 644.
121. Id. at 645.
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the child be eligible for long-term foster care.122 In 1997, an
amendment to the Non-Reunification Finding provision added that
eligibility for foster care must also be a result of abuse, neglect, or
abandonment.123 The court explained that the intent behind the
addition was to prevent applicants from using SIJS for the sole
purpose of obtaining immigration status instead of obtaining relief
from abuse, neglect, and abandonment.124 The court explained that
“eligible for long-term foster care” had always meant that family
reunification was no longer viable.125 Consequently, the addition of
the phrase “1 or both” only slightly expanded the required finding,
and that a court still has to evaluate the child’s viability of
reunification with a “family,” similar to how an immigration agency
or immigration court would analyze it.126
The Nebraska Supreme Court then reviewed unpublished decisions
by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
particularly Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) decisions, to
guide its understanding of the “1 or both” parents rule.127 The court
found that the AAO presumed that a parent who has never been in
contact with the child has abandoned that child.128 Even with such a
presumption, however, the court noticed that the AAO continued to
evaluate the viability of reunification with the other parent.129 Thus,
the court concluded that the “1 or both” language gives children who
have one parent who is unknown or cannot be found the possibility of
SIJS relief based on a finding concerning the other parent.130
According to the court, the AAO method was in keeping with the
intent to expand the pool of eligibility for SIJS.131 The court
concluded that the cases demonstrate that the USCIS does not
consider proof of one absent parent to be the end of its inquiry under
the reunification component.132 Instead, the court expressed that a

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
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petitioner normally has to show that reunification with the other
parent is also not feasible.133
The court envisioned two different scenarios: In one SIJS case, the
child could potentially reunify with only one parent because the other
is unknown.134 In another SIJS case, a child could potentially reunify
with two parents.135 The court then discussed In re E.G., a 2009 New
York case, where the child had one “absent” parent and one parent
with whom the child lived.136 The New York court found that
reunification with the known parent was not viable due to the
parent’s abuse, neglect, or abandonment.137 Based on the court’s
evaluation of the In re E.G. and AAO decisions, either an
“unknown” or “absent” parent could trigger an extra inquiry on the
other parent.138 The court then distinguished In re Erick M. from In
re E.G.139 The court did not clarify, however, how such an inquiry
would be different from a two-parent SIJS case where a court finds
one parent to have abandoned the child and the other to have abused
or neglected the child.140 The court seemed to insist that the inquiry
of their novel interpretation was a one-parent inquiry.141
The In re Erick M. court’s light treatment of legislative history and
its reliance on administrative appeals decisions as a substitute for a
more rigorous plain meaning analysis seems an odd departure from
what one would expect from a statutory interpretation analysis.
Other courts have generally declined to follow In re Erick M. and
instead adopt the reasoning and interpretation in the next case.
B.

In re Marcelina M.-G.—New York

In In re Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S.,142 the court also considered
the interpretation of the “one or both” phrase.143 The case concerned

133. Id. When revisiting this question, however, the New York court did find that
some immigration cases also considered only one parent SIJS and granted status. See
infra Part II.C.
134. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 647.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 648 (citing In re E.G., 899 N.Y.S.2d 59 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Aug. 14, 2009)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
143. The New Jersey court would later disagree with the In re Marcelina M.-G.
decision. See H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). The
New York Court of Appeals has yet to rule on the issue.
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Susy M.-G., daughter of Marcelina M.-G. and petitioner for SIJS
findings.144 Susy lived with her mother and the mother’s ex-boyfriend,
Tony, in Honduras.145 The boyfriend was “mean and violent,” so
Marcelina threw him out of the house when Susy was six.146 When
Susy was ten, Marcelina left Honduras to work in the United States
and left Susy and her half-brother, Jason, in the care of their aunt
Estella.147 Susy described her aunt as a “physically violent and
verbally abusive” woman, who would call her names and use her
mother’s money only for her own family.148 Susy’s father, Israel, was
never a part of her life.149 Marcelina added that Israel was an
alcoholic who was violent towards her.150
A few years into living with Estella, Susy arranged to leave with
her brother and illegally enter the United States.151 At first,
Marcelina did not support this plan, but she later changed her mind
and asked her boyfriend to help pay for the trip.152 In the United
States, Susy and her brother reunited with their uncle, Francisco, in
New York, where they enrolled in school.153 Susy lived with Francisco
and also reunited with her mother, who lived nearby.154 Francisco
filed for guardianship of Susy and Jason in family court.155 From the
guardianship petition, Susy and her half-brother petitioned for SIJS
findings.156 The guardianship petition alleged that Israel had never
been part of the siblings’ lives nor provided for them, and that
Marcelina had abandoned the family when she left Honduras.157 Susy
filed a separate petition for SIJS findings and alleged the same facts,
but added that Marcelina neglected her by failing to provide adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and education, as well as by allowing her to
take the perilous journey from Honduras to the Unites States.158 To

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.2d at 716
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2015]

DEFENDING ONE-PARENT SIJS

941

support her petition, Susy also submitted a letter from her caseworker
indicating that she suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.159
Although Marcelina initially supported Francisco’s guardianship
petition, she later argued that it would be in Susy’s best interest to
live with her, since Susy’s father did not have a relationship with
her.160 She also argued that Susy wanted to live with her.161 The
family court granted the mother’s custody petition but refused SIJS
findings because Susy was “with her natural parent” and to rule
otherwise would be a “strained reading of the statute.”162
On appeal, the Second Department of the New York Court of
Appeals gave an overview of the legislative history of SIJS.163 The
court emphasized that SIJS is a process that involves a predicate
order from the state court that is not an immigration status
determination,164 because a SIJS applicant could then use the findings
to obtain lawful permanent resident status from the USCIS.165 The
court expressed that the 1997 changes to SIJS were motivated by the
“concern that juveniles entering the United States as visiting students
were abusing the SIJS process.”166 The court further supported such a
characterization by quoting the 1997 Conference Report that
legislators modified SIJS “in order to limit the beneficiaries of this
provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely
abandoned, neglected, or abused children.”167 The court compared
the difference between the 1997 amendments and the 2008
amendments.168
The Second Department held that the family court erred in
denying the motion for SIJS findings.169 It found that Susy was under
twenty-one, unmarried, and placed under her mother’s custody in
satisfaction of the other SIJS provisions.170 It also found that Susy
established that reunification with her father was not viable due to

159. Id. at 718.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 722.
164. The court uses the terms “predicate order” and “predicate findings”
throughout the opinion. See id. at 719, 723.
165. Id. at 719.
166. Id. (citing Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)).
167. Id. at 720.
168. See id. at 719–20; see also supra Parts I.C–D.
169. In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
170. Id.
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abandonment.171 The Second Department additionally implicitly
accepted the family court’s SIJS rejection and its determination that
the mother did not abuse, neglect, or abandon Susy.172 The Second
Department implicitly accepted the family court’s conclusion that the
mother did not abuse, neglect, or abandon Susy despite Susy’s
allegations to the contrary.173
The court adopted a different standard of statutory interpretation
from In re Erick M., stating that the text was the “most compelling
evidence of legislative intent.”174 Under this premise, it held that at
least one treatise, two cases, and one law review article concluded
that the plain meaning of the “1 or both” provision allows for oneparent SIJS.175 The court held that its interpretation of the provision
is the same.176 The court also looked to the legislative history and
found more supporting evidence for its interpretation, despite the
plain meaning’s clarity.177 Based on this analysis, the court supported
the common understanding of the Non-Reunification Finding that the
child meets such a requirement when the child suffers abuse, neglect,
or abandonment from at least one parent and cannot viably reunify
with that parent as a result.178
The court’s characterization of legislative history in In re Marcelina
M.-G. conveys the common understanding and characterization of the
legislative history, 179 different from In re Erick M.180 In an overview
of SIJS legislative history, the court explained that preserving the
requirement that the applicant be deemed eligible for long-term
foster care clearly indicated that “SIJS was only available when
reunification with both parents was not possible.”181 It continued that
eliminating such language and replacing it with the “1 or both” phrase
indicated that only one parent’s viability needed to be examined.182

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
Mario

Id.
See id.
See id. at 717.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id. (citing In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 609722, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); In re
S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012); Angie Junck, Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status: Relief for Neglected, Abused, and Abandoned Undocumented
Children, 63 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 48, 56 (2012); CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 3-35
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 35.09(3) (2012)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
180. In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 722–24.
181. Id. (quoting In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 609722, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)).
182. Id. (quoting In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 609722, *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)).
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Such a difference in characterization implies a divergence in how the
two courts view what level of meaningful variation is permissible
when a statute’s language changes from one to another.183 The court
also explained that such an expansion of SIJS “permits ‘more
vulnerable and mistreated children to qualify for this form of legal
relief.’”184 Moreover, the court added, despite fears that an expansion
of SIJS would lead to a large increase in the granting of SIJS, SIJS
was known to be a largely underused form of legal relief.185 SIJS
represented one percent of the total amount of lawful permanent
residencies granted to persons under twenty-one, even up to 2012.186
After an examination of the general characteristics of the evolution
of SIJS, the court also addressed the interpretation proposed in In re
Erick M.187 The court noted that the Nebraska court declined to
adopt the statute’s literal meaning in In re Erick M., unlike the literal
reading that the New York court used in its own analysis of the
statute’s plain language.188 The court argued that a statutory canon
resolves that “ambiguities in immigration statutes must be read in
favor of the immigrant.”189 The court did not dwell on this point,
however, as it held that it would decide in favor of interpreting the
provision to allow for one-parent SIJS for the other reasons it
discussed.190 It also articulated a concern that foreclosing the
possibility of SIJS for Susy may mean deportation to Honduras,
where her father abandoned her and no other fit relatives can take
care of her.191 Reflecting on Susy’s welfare if she returned to
Honduras, the court clarified that the purpose of SIJS was
“protect[ing] the applicant from further abuse or maltreatment by
preventing him or her from being returned to a place where he or she
is likely to suffer further abuse or neglect.”192
The court again emphasized that the court’s role in making SIJS
findings is not to make a determination of immigration status. It
opined that Nebraska’s treatment of SIJS precluded the USCIS from

183. See infra Part III (discussing meaningful variation).
184. In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (citing LEE ET AL., supra note 2).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Yu v. Brown, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1248 (D.N.M. 2000)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 724 (quoting In re Sing W.C., 920 N.Y.S.2d 135, 140 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011)).
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applying its own interpretation of the federal law,193 when both the
state and federal governments were supposed to have a role in SIJS.194
Furthermore, the court argued that the requirement for the
Secretary’s consent addressed the concern that the relief granted
would not be for abuse, neglect, or abandonment.195 It also
challenged the assertion in In re Erick M. that the USCIS had not
granted SIJS when looking at only one parent’s abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, stating that the USCIS did make such grants of special
status without looking at the viability of reunification with the other
parent.196
C.

H.S.P. v. J.K.—New Jersey

In H.S.P. v. J.K., the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the
Nebraska Supreme Court’s In re Erick M. interpretation regarding
the Non-Reunification Finding.197 Further, it expanded upon the
analysis of the legislative history of SIJS by examining direct quotes
from the Congressional Record around the passage of the TVPRA in
2008.198 The court tried to further uncover the development of SIJS
from a statute that had an unclear requirement about eligibility for
foster care to one that more narrowly targeted abused, neglected, and
abandoned children.199 It cited In re Marcelina M.-G.200 as holding an
alternative interpretation without further treatment or rebuttal of the
arguments made in the prior case.201
In H.S.P., petitioner H.S.P. was the uncle of M.S. H.S.P. sought
custody of M.S., and together they applied for SIJS findings with the
Chancery Division, Family Part.202 M.S. was born and raised in
India.203 He had no recollection of meeting his father, B.S., but lived
in “disease-ridden slums” with his mother J.K., who was the named
opposing party in the case, acting cooperatively with the uncle in the

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. Domestic
Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions 3 (Mar.
24, 2009)).
196. Id.
197. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014)
198. Id. at 267–68.
199. Id. at 266–67.
200. 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
201. H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 265.
202. Id. at 255.
203. Id. at 258.
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custody petition.204 Without adequate medical care, M.S.’s siblings
died of illnesses, and his mother became terminally ill.205 M.S. then
lived with his grandmother, worked a construction job at the age of
fifteen, and developed back pain and a skin condition.206 M.S.’s
mother and grandmother arranged for M.S. to travel from Turkey to
Mexico, and then across the southern border of the United States to
live with H.S.P.207 While living in New Jersey with his uncle, M.S.
eventually obtained a General Education Development (GED)
diploma.208 Included in the SIJS petition, J.K. requested that the
court enter a default judgment against her, claiming that she
“abandoned” M.S.209 However, the lower court did not find that there
was sufficient evidence to show that “either of his parents” neglected
or abandoned M.S.210 Consequently, petitioners appealed.211
Initially, M.S. claimed that both of his parents abused, neglected, or
abandoned him, rather than presenting a one-parent SIJS case.212 The
court, however, took the opportunity to use the case to contemplate
the meaning of the “1 or both” language in the TVPRA revision of
the SIJS provisions.213 Before the court considered this question, it
expressed concern that the petitioners brought the case primarily to
acquire SIJS status and a green card, 214 suggesting that there may be
an improper purpose for invoking the jurisdiction of the family
court.215 The court bypassed this concern and held that M.S. did not
meet the Non-Reunification Finding.216
The court also addressed the petitioner’s claim that the father
neglected and abandoned M.S. without naming the father in the
complaint or attempting to serve him.217 The court stated that a
parent should have a chance to oppose allegations of abuse or neglect
and petitions from non-parents for custody of the child because such a

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 260–61.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 261.
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case “resembles the termination of parental rights.”218 An additional
concern was that the parent may not have been reasonably located or
that petitioner did not adequately attempt service.219 Finally, the
court noted that there may be a possible conflict between the INA
provision that the child “shall not be compelled to contact the alleged
abuser . . . at any stage,” but left both of these concerns unresolved.220
The concerns above were ultimately dicta because the court did not
make a determination on those grounds.221 However, they reflect the
way that the court viewed its role: as a gatekeeper of the country’s
borders in matters affecting children’s welfare and immigration status,
which may be a perspective that influences the persuasiveness of its
overall statutory interpretation.222 Such concerns set the stage for the
court’s holding in this case.
The court interpreted relevant New Jersey state law to determine
that the Non-Reunification Finding was satisfied with respect to
J.K.223 It held that a failure to provide due to poverty did not meet
the required element of willful, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior
to constitute neglect under New Jersey law.224 Additionally, it held
that the standard for “abuse,” under New Jersey law is relative.225
According to the court, when a parent permits a child to work in
particular conditions, it is only considered “abuse” if those conditions
were contrary to the labor laws under which the child worked.226 As a
result, it held that J.K.’s actions were not willful abandonment
because she kept in contact with M.S. and only wanted the best for
him.227 With respect to M.S.’s father, the court upheld the lower
court’s finding that he willfully abandoned M.S. because his continued
absence demonstrated his “settled purpose” to abandon his child.228
The decision regarding the father and mother effectively transformed
an allegation of two cases of parental abuse, neglect, and

218. Id.
219. See id.
220. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(h) (2012)).
221. “We do not attempt in this appeal to resolve that apparent conflict. Despite
our concerns, we will assume that the judge’s custody determination is sufficient to
satisfy the first precondition for SIJ status, and we will examine the judge’s other
findings under Subparagraph J.” Id.
222. See infra Part III.C.
223. H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 262.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 263.
227. See id. at 264.
228. Id.

2015]

DEFENDING ONE-PARENT SIJS

947

abandonment into a one-parent SIJS case.229 Such an outcome
allowed the court to move to considering whether the interpretation
of “1 or both” in the INA allowed for one-parent SIJS cases.230
The court held in favor of the In re Erick M. interpretation of the
Non-Reunification Finding but omitted the textual analysis of the
provision as was done in In re Erick M.231 The court then examined
the legislative history of SIJS to determine if its interpretation of
legislative intent supported or precluded the In re Erick M.
interpretation.232 First, it looked at the Senator Domenici’s statement
in a congressional hearing regarding the possible abuses in
immigration law as well as a conference report discussing the purpose
of the 1997 amendments.233 Senator Domenici expressed concern
over the students’ ability to “manipulate the system to obtain
permanent residence.”234 The conference report did not explicitly
reiterate Senator Domenici’s concern, but it stated that the
amendments to the SIJS provisions were meant to “limit the
beneficiaries of [the Non-Reunification Finding] to those juveniles for
whom it was created” and to ensure that the purpose was primarily to
obtain relief from abuse and neglect, not to obtain an adjustment of
immigration status.235
In addition, the court studied the legislative history of the 2008
changes.236 The phrase “1 or both” came with little explanation, but
the court relied on two other statements to analyze the TVPRA’s
legislative history.237 First, a statement from one of the senators
stressed concerns about illegal immigration and immigration fraud,
while Senator Dianne Feinstein, right before the bill’s passage, stated
that, “[t]his legislation does not expand the current immigration rights

229. Id.
230. Id. at 266.
231. See id. The In re Erick M. holding has two components: the first is that
generally the courts must look at whether reunification with both parents is a viable
option. Id. Since the provision is bifurcated, the second component explains that if
one parent is “deceased or unable to protect the child from the unsafe parent” then
the court can consider this an unfeasible reunification with “1” parent. Id.
232. See id. at 266–68.
233. Id. at 266 (citing Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir.
2003)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2941.
234. H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 266.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 267.
237. Id.
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of any child.”238
Senator Feinstein continued, “[i]nstead, [the
TVPRA] presumes that children will be placed in removal
proceedings—unless they qualify for immigration benefits under
current law.”239
The court characterized the legislative intent of SIJS as
“prevent[ing] the return of juveniles to unsafe parents,” but also
“prevent[ing] misuse of SIJS statute for immigration advantage.”240 It
concluded that allowing one-parent SIJS cases in general would be
contrary to legislative intent because it would allow a child who can
reunify with a “safe parent” to obtain SIJS status even if reunification
with that “safe parent” would not lead to further contact with the
“unsafe parent.”241 The court added that “or both” would be
superfluous when interpreted to allow one-parent SIJS because the
provision simply would have said reunification is not viable with one
parent.242 For the H.S.P. court, the particular outcome for M.S.
comports well with the legislative intent of the “protection of those
abused, neglected, or abandoned juveniles whose compelled
repatriation would place them in danger from a parent who abused,
neglected, or abandoned them.”243 Assuming that the rejection of
SIJS for M.S. meant his repatriation to India, the court may be
satisfied that he had the option to return to his mother, the “safe
parent,” whom the court found had not abused, neglected, or
abandoned him.244
III. CONSIDERING THE MEANING OF “1 OR BOTH” AND THE
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF ONE-PARENT SIJS CASES FROM
ITS S COPE
Although the three views slightly differed in their approaches,
there is a noticeable pattern to statutory interpretation that can help
to analyze and resolve the dispute between the two different

238. Id. (citing 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 268.
241. Id. The “safe parent” language mirrors the language used in Erick M. and
may have originated from the case. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Neb.
2012).
242. H.S.P. 87 A.3d at 268. Note, however, that the concern over the rule of
superfluity was not dispositive in this case or in the Erick M. case. See In re Erick M.,
820 N.W.2d at 644.
243. H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 268.
244. Id. at 269.
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interpretations.245 First, courts look to the words explicitly used in the
text.246 The words themselves are the source of interpretation
whether or not the rule is to sort out ambiguous text247 or to rule out
contradicting interpretations based on legislative intent.248 After
interpretation of the text, the next step is to consult the legislative
history, either to confirm a particular interpretation249 or to rule out
interpretations that are contradictory.250 When faced with a provision
that still defies direct interpretation from the text or history, a court
may ask which interpretation best responds to the problem at hand.
Part III of this Note argues that the text’s plain meaning,, the
interpretative variations, and the statutory canons strongly point
towards the one-parent SIJS interpretation. Although the legislative
history does not directly nor definitively favor one interpretation, it
strongly implies the one-parent SIJS interpretation. Finally, this Part
considers why one-parent SIJS, which takes a small step towards a
type of immigration policy that accepts children as persons, is a better
answer than narrowing and gatekeeping.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Text and the Legislative History in
Support of the One-Parent SIJS Interpretation
The plain meaning of the text of SIJS suggests that the provision
allows for a one-parent SIJS interpretation. The Nebraska court’s
approach to statutory interpretation in In re Erick M. placed plain
meaning above other forms of determining legislative intent.251 The
Nebraska court does not consider legislative history or any other tool
of statutory interpretation unless the text’s meaning is unambiguous
on its face.252 By default, it looked to legislative history by proposing
a “reasonable interpretation” to “or” in the phrase “reunification
with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable” and concluded
that a court should evaluate the viability of reunification with both
parents unless viability of reunification with one parent is impossible,
at which point a court could look to just one parent.253 However, the

245. See supra Part II (showing an analytical pattern between the three cases).
246. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644; H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 266; In re Marcelina
M.-G., 973 N.Y.S. 2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
247. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644.
248. See In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
249. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 647.
250. See H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 268.
251. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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court considered such a reinterpretation as sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant consultation of the legislative history.254 Yet, it is difficult to
imagine that Congress, despite contemplating a multitude of scenarios
that could occur to abused, neglected, and abandoned children, chose
to characterize its instructions of these scenarios in only two ways.
Though a court can conceivably introduce ambiguity to the text, it
does not follow that the text is ambiguous on its face. Given that
social context strongly influences a word’s meaning, it would be
difficult to find a phrase or sentence that was not susceptible to more
than one meaning.255
The court in In re Erick M. also did not purely rely on the text for
its interpretation, but looked at what administrative appeals decisions
set forth.256 While evaluating the AAO decisions, however, the In re
Erick M. court failed to analyze whether the decision looked at both
parents’ abuse, neglect, or abandonment—instead of one parent’s—
was necessary to the holding for every case where it was challenged.257
Even the approach used in In re Erick M. is not completely
persuasive in indicating the phrase’s plain meaning because the AAO
also heard cases where it evaluated only one of the parent’s nonviability for reunification.258
New York’s interpretation better captures the plain meaning than
does Nebraska’s. It is clearer that the use of the word “or” creates a
disjunction, and this has always come to plainly mean that there are
two requirements that are independently sufficient to satisfy a
particular element or provision.259 Moreover, many thought that
changing the SIJS provisions in 2008 would clarify the statue’s
meaning, particularly that the meaning of “one or both” would
overwhelmingly convey the idea that one-parent SIJS cases were
eligible.260 The proposed USCIS guidelines interpreting the meaning

254. See supra Part II.B.
255. See Plain Meaning, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at
Westlaw BLACKS.
256. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 646.
257. Meghan Johnson & Yasmin Yavar, Uneven Access to Special Immigration

Juvenile Status: How the Nebraska Supreme Court Became an Immigration
Gatekeeper, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 64, 84 (2013).
258. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
259. Id.
260. See generally In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 6097225, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); In
re Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012); Brief for Appellant at 8, In
re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639 (Neb. 2012) (No. S-11-000919), 2012 WL 10785183, at
*8; LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3; Anderson, supra note 2, at 683; Jennifer Baum et
al., Most in Need but Least Served: Legal and Practical Barriers to Special Immigrant
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of “1 or both” also indicate that one-parent SIJS applications are
allowed.261 Even the New Jersey court in H.S.P. admitted that many
commentators and courts interpreted the provision that way, while
Nebraska was alone in interpreting otherwise.262 Although none of
these are persuasive on their own right, the existence of documents
from advocates, government, the ABA,263 and courts, even before In
re Erick M., strongly suggests that the one-parent SIJS interpretation
better captures what the words would ordinarily mean.264
The interpretation introduced in In re Erick M. may have also
impermissibly minimized the meaningful variation derived from the
shift in the language. As previously noted, the 2008 provisions varied
significantly from the original 1997 language: “eligible for long-term
foster care”265 became “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s
parents is not available due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a
similar basis found under State law.”266 The court used the baseline
that federal regulation has always interpreted the 1997 provision to
mean that “family reunification was no longer viable” and was
reluctant to depart from this interpretation unless courts and
administrative decisions ruled otherwise.267 However, the court does
not offer a reason to be so cautious when the language between the
two provisions is so different. The Nebraska argument is that the
inclusion of one is to allow applicants who have one parent but not
the other.
However, the Nebraska court did not sufficiently distinguish its
interpretation from two parent SIJS cases: the court could find that
one parent abandoned the child and that the other parent also
abused, neglected, or abandoned the child. Effectively, the court’s
interpretation that SIJS is unavailable to children who have a “safe
parent” with whom they can reunify seems to nullify the 2008
amendment because it ultimately interpreted the “one or both”
language as a variation of a two parent SIJS evaluation.268 That would

Juvenile Status for Federally Detained Minors, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 621, 622 (2012);
Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
261. Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978, 54,982, 54,985
(proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205, 245).
262. See H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
263. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
264. See Ordinary Meaning, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at
Westlaw BLACKS.
265. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460 (1997).
266. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i) (2012).
267. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Neb. 2012).
268. Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 84.
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be contrary to the legislative intent identified in In re Marcelina M.G.: that the shift from the 1997 to the 2008 language meant to move
the inquiry beyond simply two-parent SIJS evaluations.269
Even the court in In re Erick M. did not rely on its textual
interpretation to conclusively hold that its decision represented the
statute’s plain meaning.270 The court merely used this interpretation
to consider the phrase ambiguous and open to other tools of
interpretation.271 For example, one canon of interpretation that the
Nebraska court did not consider was that ambiguities in immigration
statutes should be resolved in the immigrant’s favor.272 Ultimately, all
three courts turn to legislative history to help determine the
provision’s actual meaning.273
The New Jersey court in H.S.P. used a form of interpretation that
relied more heavily on legislative history.274 The New Jersey court
evaluated competing textual interpretations and then used the
legislative history to selectively invalidate statutory interpretations
that contradicted what it found to be the legislative intent.275 The
New Jersey approach places less emphasis on the text itself, but it
runs the risk of mistakenly imputing the legislation’s meaning from
one legislator’s words and comments without providing the proper
context. Members of Congress vote for many reasons, and the
Congressional record did not provide a direct explanation of most
relevant phrase that needed to be interpreted: the “1 or both”
language.276
In fact, the Nebraska and New Jersey courts both analyzed the
legislative history of the SIJS provisions that, compounded with their
interpretation of legislative intent, painted an inaccurate picture of
what was actually happening to children at that time.277 From their

269. See supra Part II. B.
270. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644.
271. See Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 82.
272. See supra Part II. B.
273. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 645; H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014); In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013).
274. The idea behind New Jersey’s approach is that out of multiple, or in this case
two, interpretations the court relies on legislative history to eliminate the incorrect
ones. See H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 268.
275. Id.
276. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-5; see also H.S.P., 87
A.3d at 267.
277. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672 (“In 2011, out of 1,062,040 immigrants
obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained legal status through
SIJS.”); Jackson, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that in 2010, 1492 gained lawful

2015]

DEFENDING ONE-PARENT SIJS

953

analysis, the 1990 SIJS provisions were too broad and the 1997
provisions intended to curtail the relevant language, limit the type of
beneficiaries, and avoid abuses in the law.278 Both courts also
proposed that their interpretation of legislative intent supported their
interpretation of the text itself.279 Senator Domenici’s concerns280
about the 1990 SIJS provision and the potential for abuse, however,
did not significantly reflect reality. The actual pool of successful SIJS
beneficiaries remained low in comparison to all immigrants under the
age of twenty-one.281 Best estimates by immigration attorneys suggest
that roughly several hundred acquired SIJS.282 The numbers were
generally not significant in a way that some feared they would be.283
Although Nebraska and New Jersey correctly point out that some
members of Congress were concerned about possible fraud and
manipulation of the system, it is not clear that the addition of the
“abuse, neglect, or abandonment” language quelled these concerns.
The language was equally likely intended to clarify the law’s true
beneficiaries. However, clarifying that the law’s beneficiary is a
person who suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment does not
categorically rule out one-parent SIJS cases because a court order
would still need to find that he or she in fact suffered from abuse,
neglect, and abandonment. It is also an unlikely interpretation that
the 1997 language of abuse, neglect, or abandonment was a restrictive
addition. At the time, the general understanding was that the
beneficiaries of SIJS were primarily children who suffered from
abuse, neglect, or abandonment and the statute sought to protect
children in need.284 The addition of the “abuse, neglect, and
abandonment” language more accurately reflects the evolving
understanding of advocates, courts, and government regarding

permanent residence through SIJS compared to the 1,042,625 people that acquired
lawful permanent residence); In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
278. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Neb. 2012); H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 266–
68.
279. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 645 (considering their interpretation a
“reasonable interpretation,” and holding in favor of the In re Erick M. interpretation
and its “fully analyzed” interpretation of the statute).
280. See Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003).
281. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672 (“In 2011, out of 1,062,040 immigrants
obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained legal status through
SIJS.”); Jackson, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that in 2010, 1492 gained lawful
permanent residence through SIJS compared to the 1,042,625 people that acquired
lawful permanent residence); In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
282. Porter, supra note 48, at 444.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 448.
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immigrant children, their identities, and what that implies for
immigrant children’s rights, liberties, and needs.285 Instead, the likely
and actual candidate for effectuating the intention of avoiding abuse
in SIJS, as New York correctly points out, was the addition of the
consent provision.286 Furthermore, given the courts’ limited role in
making predicate orders and the federal government’s clearly
accepted power over immigration, imputing the role of limiting and
identifying fraud and abuse seems more logically located in the
federal government’s hands.287
Immigration authorities more
appropriately employ the type of gatekeeping analysis used in In re
Erick M. and H.S.P. when entertaining concerns over immigration
fraud or abuse.288
In H.S.P. the court acknowledged that the legislative history
analysis was not compelling on its own, and included more direct
language from the congressional record during the TVPRA’s
passage.289 One problem with legislative history is that it may impute
meaning from legislators’ past statements that may no longer reflect
the present legislators’ intent.290 Eleven years passed between 1997
and 2008. The more recent statements made in the Congressional
record may better reflect the legislators’ intent instead.291
When evaluating the congressional record for the TVPRA, the gist
of the argument in H.SP. was: (1) Senator Feinstein claimed that the
act did not expand the children’s current immigration rights, and (2)
other legislators’ goal was to modify provisions that otherwise allow
for increased illegal immigration and immigration fraud.292 The first
issue with the court’s analysis of 2008 congressional records is that it
takes Senator Feinstein’s comment out of context. Right before the

285. See infra Part III.C.
286. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. Domestic
Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions 3 (Mar.
24, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf; see also Ooi, supra note
14, at 890.
287. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
288. Id.
289. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
290. Compare Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing Senator Pete Domenici’s concerns over immigration fraud), with 147 CONG.
REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein)
(emphasizing improving access to SIJS and current forms of relief).
291. See 147 CONG. REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
292. See supra Part II.C.
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bill’s passage, Senator Feinstein took the time to thank her fellow
legislators and highlight a part of the bill that was important to her.293
During that speech, she specifically highlighted the part of the bill
that provided for improvements in the procedural treatment of
unaccompanied immigrant children in detention.294 That part of the
bill did not in fact expand on any immigration rights of children. If
viewed out of context, Senator Feinstein’s statement contradicts the
actual bill because it “expands on the immigration provisions of [the
Traffic Victims Protection Act 2000].”295 The Senator spoke directly
to the legislators’ intent as to the SIJS provisions when she introduced
the bill in 2007.296 One purpose, which the accompanying text of the
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act explained, was to
streamline SIJS.297 As the New Jersey court correctly pointed out,
other legislators made sure to modify provisions that would
encourage illegal immigration and immigration fraud.298 Congress
was familiar with the language in the Non-Reunification Finding
under the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act,299 and it
remained unchanged upon passage, suggesting that Congress had
acquiesced to such language.
B. Addressing Gatekeeping Concerns Related to the Expansion
of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status to Include One-Parent SIJS
Even after reviewing the text and legislative history, external
concerns still bothered some courts. These concerns act as a gloss
over how the courts interpreted the provisions or their application.300
One concern about the expansion of SIJS is the potential increase of
fraudulent or dubious claims in front of the state courts.301 However,
the final decision on an applicant’s immigration status still rests with

293. See 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
294. Id.
295. See 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith).
For example, the TVPRA added waivers to grounds of
inadmissibility for special immigrant juveniles seeking legal residence. See LEE ET
AL., supra note 2, at 6.
296. 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein).
297. Id.
298. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
299. See supra Part I.D.
300. See supra notes 215–35 and accompanying text; H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 268
(expressing concern over laws becoming a “gateway” to more migration).
301. See H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 267.
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the federal government.302 The concern with dubious claims also does
not apply uniquely to one-parent SIJS cases.303 Instead, any case that
comes to the state courts could potentially face the same problems of
a lack of evidence, difficulty locating or serving particular parties, and
a willingness by even opposing parties to default judgment in the
custody claim.304 There is little reason for state courts to concern
themselves with the following issues unless they view their roles in the
process as gatekeepers of the United States borders, instead of as
experts in the applicant child’s welfare and permanency.305
There are some concerns that such an expansive definition would
necessarily result in an increase in migration to the United States.306
The enactment of SIJS provisions in 1990 similarly did not cause an
increase in migration.307 Similarly, an increase in forms of relief for
Soviet refugees in the United States did not increase migration.308
Specifically for SIJS, it is unlikely that a child would intentionally
suffer abuse, neglect, and abandonment just to acquire eligibility for
status.309 Even if immigration laws themselves caused an increase in
immigration, state courts have not traditionally been the enforcers of
the United States borders; their role in SIJS is to focus on
implications concerning welfare for the applicant requesting SIJS
findings.310
A review of the text’s plain and ordinary meaning suggests that
one-parent SIJS is the more ordinary and plain interpretation of the
2008 SIJS provision. Furthermore, a review of the current legislative
history strongly suggests that concerned legislators did not object to
the expansion of SIJS provisions. Moreover, interpreting the
meaning of “1 or both” to include one-parent SIJS cases expands the
substantive law in relation to what was allowed in the past, but it does
not confer a “free pass” into the United States, as the singular finding
is balanced by other considerations.
302. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
303. See Carr, supra note 42, at 157 (speaking generally about immigration law).
304. Id. at 150, 157.
305. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2 (noting that the gateway role belongs to
the immigration agencies).
306. Although it is difficult to divine what the future may hold for an expanded
definition, a comparative look at Canadian policy suggests that a more open policy on
its own does not affect the level of migration into the country. See Carr, supra note
42, at 149.
307. See supra Part I.E.
308. Ooi, supra note 14, at 906.
309. Id.
310. The court’s role is to make predicate findings. See In re Marcelina M.-G., 973
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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One-Parent SIJS Is the Best Answer for Unaccompanied
Immigrant Children

In determining the best approach to adjudicating cases that
necessarily affect children’s futures, state courts have taken an
important position that a strictly textual reading of the TVPRA
would undermine.311 Even if the text or the legislative history is
insufficiently persuasive, the one-parent SIJS reading provides the
best interpretation of the provision.
The one-parent SIJS interpretation of the “1 or both” language is
consistent with the meaning of TVPRA in light of the circumstances
surrounding its passage, regarding the development of the
immigration system built around unaccompanied immigrant
children.312 It is also consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase
“1 or both.”313 By limiting the interpretation of the TVPRA language,
courts undermine the effect of a movement toward a standard of
policy, construction of identity, and treatment of children that is
currently present in the unaccompanied immigrant children system.
A question for the court necessarily includes what its proper role is
in making these interpretations. Principles of statutory interpretation
are persuasive because they give deference to the text on which the
majority voted through legislative action. Yet, the courts should also
consider their important function as a check against the limitations of
majoritarian rule.314 Unaccompanied immigrant children are unable
to participate in the political process and cannot be part of the
majority at all.315 They are apolitical and citizens with limited rights.316
Due to their identity as immigrants and as children.
Their

311. See id. at 723 (stating concern over children’s welfare and not just
immigration status determinations, the court noted that “[t]he expansion in the
definition of SIJS to allow a juvenile court to consider the non-viability of family
reunification with just one parent, rather than both, permits ‘more vulnerable and
mistreated children to qualify for this form of relief’”).
312. See supra Part I.D.
313. See supra Part I.D.
314. The Supreme Court has considered such a question when considering
protections for racial minorities. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
315. See Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of
the Child Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
131, 137 (2006).
316. M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied
Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 311, 328 (2010).
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marginalization from the political process creates a particular
vulnerability that courts should weigh against other concerns.317
One way that courts have made effective progress, without
overreaching their role in the tripartite governing system, is to
consider different underlying constructions that influence legislative
and agency action.318 Such a consideration is fitting for the judicial
branch. Relative to the other branches, the courts tend to focus on
analyzing the logic, reasoning, and the underlying principles and
paradigms that influence the meaning of legislation.319 The evolution
of SIJS provisions and the general immigrant child system reflect an
evolving construction of children’s identities.320 Under the INS, the
framework governing unaccompanied immigrant children’s treatment
reflects the threatening construction of children’s identity.321 One
characterization of the INS framework explains that unaccompanied
immigrant children are generally dangerous threats to scarce
resources and are disposable because their rights and dignity as
people can be violated with little recourse.322
The Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement reflected a different
paradigm.323 In one way, the agreement reflected the dependency
construction of the child’s identity.324 Provisions in the agreement
suggest that children are persons in need of minimum services and
require the establishment of a system solely dedicated to meet such
needs.325 In another way, the Agreement also introduced the

317. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 907.
318. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 331.
319. Supreme Court justices have expressed since the beginning of the United
States that the task of judges is to say what the law is and interpret them. See, e.g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
320. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 326–28; see also Jacqueline Bhabha,
Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 227 (2004).
321. “This construction presents childhood as a site that is threatening,
burdensome, or disposable.” Somers et al., supra note 316, at 330.
322. See id. at 339; see also Thronson, supra note 55, at 1013.
323. See generally Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV854544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
immigrants/flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf; see also Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention

and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The Devastating Consequences of
Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE F. FOR L.
& SOC. CHANGE 63, 73 (2011).
324. “The dependency construction presents childhood as a site for having the
needs of the child met while also limiting the agency of the child.” Somers et al.,
supra note 316, at 326.
325. Id. at 339–40.
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autonomous and developmental construction.326 The Agreement
provided for acculturation and adaptation services to allow children
to develop independently and responsibly.327 Additionally, it included
assessment programs to evaluate the child’s personal goals, strengths,
and weaknesses, while also recognizing the child’s right to privacy and
religion.328 The continued development of the shelter system under
the framework of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement has the
potential to promote even more possibilities for respecting a child’s
autonomy and agency.329
The Stipulated Flores Settlement
Agreement introduced a perspective of the child’s identity that better
balances the concern that children are developing persons, who have
a limited ability to assert their rights.330
SIJS is equally
groundbreaking and is characterized by some as “a radical break from
the dominant modes of thinking about children in immigration
law.”331
One perspective that In re Erick M. and H.S.P. did not consider is
the possibility that the adoption of the “1 or both” language could be
equally influenced by the paradigm shift from a threatening
construction to an autonomous construction of the child’s identity. In
some ways, the New Jersey and Nebraska courts’ focus on the
possibility of fraud and abuse332 in the system attempts a revival of the
threatening construction—the two courts construct every new
opportunity or chance given to persons as an opportunity for them to
undermine the system. Otherwise, concerns over the parents’
procedural rights seem to be an important but secondary concern to a
system that the legislators sanctioned and built to center on the child.
Through the TVPRA, Congress codified the best interest
determination and placed children in the least restrictive setting,
which was the framework established by the Stipulated Flores
Settlement Agreement.333 The question is open as to whether or not it
326. “The developmental construction presents childhood as a progression of
cognitive and psychosocial development towards adulthood” while “[t]he
autonomous construction presents childhood as a space of autonomy and agency.” Id.
at 325, 328.
327. Id. at 340.
328. Id.
329. In one of the shelters, the children are able to elect a representative that could
convey concerns and grievances to the shelter administrators. Id. at 349.
330. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1002.
331. Laura P. Wexler, Note, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What
Should Be Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 574 (2008).
332. See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
333. Somers et al., supra note 316, at 356–57; Wendy Young & Megan McKenna,

The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee and
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also means that Congress is moving towards accepting the
autonomous and developmental construction underlying the
Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement. The Unaccompanied Alien
Child Protection Act combines both systems together under one
banner.334 It is an opportunity for courts to consider such a question.
By choosing to further the autonomous construction of children,
courts simply are choosing to give children greater dignity as human
beings. Most courts incorporate this approach in their analysis and
treatment of the “1 or both” language, which results in a conclusion
that is more consistent with the developing unaccompanied
immigrant child system.335
State courts are also in a unique position as experts in family law
and their understanding of the meaning of the SIJS provisions, as is
recognized by the SIJS statute.336 Although SIJS is governed by
federal legislation, the law’s provisions clearly indicate a space for the
role of state courts based on their expertise in the realm of family

Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 253 (2010)
(“[The] TVPRA states that an unaccompanied child in HHS custody ‘shall be
promptly placed in the least restrictive setting . . . .’”).
334. Senator Dianne Feinstein’s first introduction of the Act carries many of the
ideas that influenced the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement and the Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status provisions:
Unaccompanied children are among the most vulnerable of the immigrant
population; many have entered the country under traumatic circumstances.
They are unable to protect themselves adequately from danger. Because of
their youth and the fact that they are alone, they are often subject to abuse
and exploitation . . . .
Because of their age and inexperience,
unaccompanied alien children are not able to articulate their fears, their
views, or testify to their needs as accurately as adults can. Despite these
facts, the U.S. immigration laws and policies have been developed and
implemented without careful attention to their effect on children,
particularly on unaccompanied alien children.
146 CONG. REC. S9381-05 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein). The Senator continues:
The Flores agreement requires that the INS treat minors with dignity,
respect, and special concern for their particular vulnerability. It also
requires the INS to place each detained minor in the least restrictive setting
appropriate to the child’s age and special needs. . . . As a nation that holds
our democratic ideals and constitutional rights paramount, how then can we
continue to avert our attention from repeated violations of some of the most
basic human rights against children who have no voice in the immigration
system? We should be outraged that children who come to the U.S. alone,
many against their will, are subjected to such inhumane, excessive
conditions.

Id.
335. See, e.g. In re Marisol N.H., 979 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); In
re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
336. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1004.
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law.337 SIJS is unique in that it is a hybrid scheme, wherein the
collaboration between federal government and state government
allows both to exercise their expertise.338 The traditional notion that
federalism entails a division of labor has persisted in the
characterization of family law and Congressional deference of child
welfare to states.339 Such a division of roles has resulted in the federal
system lagging behind state courts in the substantive and procedural
developments in family law.340 Particularly, immigration law that has
a prominent effect on the child’s life and child’s relationship with her
family tends to lack the consideration of the “best interests of the
child.”341 Immigration courts, in general, are not at all specialized or
expert enough to effectively use a child-centric approach.342 The
treatment of unaccompanied immigrant children in the immigration
system is a notable exception that has been borne from the work of
advocates who are in fact familiar with family law.343
Given Congress’s history of deference to states in matters of child
welfare,344 courts should consider that Congress’s silence in the
legislative history of SIJS does not necessarily limit the way that
courts may also exercise their expertise relative to family law. The
court’s expertise in developing the standard of the “best interests of
the child” in cases involving children is one of the reasons why courts
defer SIJS findings to state courts.345 Child custody laws in all states
have a “best interests of the child” standard, and such an approach
has been in development since the twentieth century.346 Courts have
considered the “best interests of the child” when making
determinations in abuse and neglect proceedings, and they assign
guardians ad litem to the child to protect the child’s best interests.347
No single standard for the “best interests of the child” can be

337. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012) clearly indicates that court findings are
required for determinations of abuse, neglect, and abandonment, but not for other
inquiries such as consent and return to the country of origin. See also Porter, supra
note 48, at 447–49.
338. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1004–05.
339. See id. at 1004.
340. See Porter, supra note 48, at 453.
341. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1003.
342. See id. at 1005.
343. See supra Part I.A.
344. Nothing in the Constitution gives the federal government explicit power over
matters of child welfare, and it may be a power strongly reserved to the states. See
Porter, supra note 48, at 454.
345. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
346. See Carr, supra note 42, at 124–25; see also Dalrymple, supra note 315, at 142.
347. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26.
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determined among the fifty states, but it is clear that it at least
prioritizes the child’s safety, permanency, and wellbeing.348
SIJS evaluations do not adequately consider the “best interests of
the child.” Although the law provides for a “[determination] in
administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the
alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence,”349 the
best interest finding required by the SIJS provision does not include
all the factors that a court normally considers when evaluating the
“best interests of the child.”350 The “best interests” finding is limited
primarily because it is a negative consideration.351 The best interest
finding is specifically to determine when it is not in the child’s best
interest to return to the country of origin.352 Conversely, in custody
determinations, courts have more discretion to make decisions about
a child based on the “best interests of the child” standard.353 In the
custody context, a best interest consideration encompasses far more
variables than what the limited SIJS analysis allows. In considering a
child’s best interest, a court may look at a variety of factors, and the
decision may be more complex than a binary determination of
whether a child gets to stay in one place over another.354
A concern for the child’s safety and well-being portrays the child as
dependent on third party intervention and support, which echoes the
dependency construction.355 Considering the safety and well-being of
the child in immigration matters would be a modest shift that is
already consistent with the court’s concerns in non-immigration
proceedings that relate to the welfare of children.356 On the other

348. See id. at 126–27.
349. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012).
350. Other considerations include the well-being, safety, and permanence of the
child while the particular provision in SIJS is limited to such inquiries related to a
child’s return home. See Carr, supra note 42, at 127.
351. Compare Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Treatment of Unaccompanied
and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6
(Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child] (employing the
best interests of the child standard as a positive obligation at all stages of interaction
with the child), with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (employing the best interests of the
child standard only when considering whether the child is to be returned to his or her
country of origin).
352. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
353. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26.
354. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3.
355. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 326–27.
356. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26.
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hand, limiting a child, who has suffered abuse, neglect, and
abandonment at the hands of one parent from reuniting with another
parent, with whom the child may have a chance to develop a
permanent and safe relationship, is an arbitrary foreclosure of the
child’s best interest. It is also an especially harsh line to draw in
making determinations affecting a child’s life, especially given the
apparent reason and context of the child’s migration to the United
States.
Additionally, the lack of uniformity among the states regarding the
definition of “1 or both” unequally grants necessary relief to some
children who have experienced abuse, neglect, and abandonment but
not to others.357 The number of children that receive the special
immigrant status of SIJS has been historically low,358 partly due to the
split in state definitions. A notable example is the different age-out
and jurisdictional requirements of states for dependency on juvenile
courts.359 Another split in state definitions would present further
procedural hurdles that deny relief to children exposed to additional
exploitation and instability.360 Moreover, such a concern also reflects
the intent of Congress to respect federalism in the same way it defers
to courts for family law determinations.361 Because the federal
government is not an expert in the child’s permanence and stability,
courts must also respect that the federal nature of immigration law
requires some uniformity in the outcome for all children, regardless of
forum.362
Most courts correctly exercise their role and function in the
immigration system when contemplating and allowing one-parent
SIJS cases.363 It seems only human to consider the consequences of
abuse and neglect experienced by SIJS applicants if they were to be
denied special immigrant status even when the SIJS applicant cannot
viably reunify with at least one parent.364 One of the more recent
appellate division cases that affirmed the interpretation favoring oneparent SIJS reasoned that “[a]lone, without either parent or their
maternal grandmother, the children would face the prospect of having

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672; see also Jackson, supra note 49, at 22.
See Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 77.
See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2.
See Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 76.
See id.
See In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
See In re Marisol N.H., 979 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
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to protect themselves from violent gang members.”365 Such a concern
reflects the court’s careful consideration of children’s lives, and not
just a blanket argument used to open the borders for more
immigration. In another case, the court underscored the goal of relief
from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment as the purpose of SIJS,
and also cautioned that such a law may expose potential SIJS
applicants to other forms of violence while they journey to the United
States.366 More importantly, such a concern better reflects the trend
in domestic family law to incorporate the “best interests of the child”
and to prioritize the safety, well-being, and permanency of children.367
In examining SIJS and the legal framework governing
unaccompanied immigrant children as a whole, courts also have the
opportunity to consider the humanitarian function that SIJS serves.368
The “best interests of the child” standard was adopted from family
law and was expanded upon by international law for largely
humanitarian reasons.369 The idea that SIJS encompasses such
concerns is also fairly modest. SIJS already waives most other
exclusionary provisions that would generally apply in other parts of
immigration law “for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when it
is otherwise in the public interest.”370 Furthermore, in the twenty-first
century, children are recognized global citizens with explicitly defined
rights and protections.371 We should increasingly look at the
phenomenon of child migration as a global responsibility.
The best interests standard is a general rubric for applying and
evaluating a child’s well-being.372 It is not only the overarching
doctrine of U.S. family law, but also of international human rights

365. See id.; see also In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (“The expansion
in the definition of SIJS to allow a juvenile court to consider the nonviability of
family reunification with just one parent, rather than both, permits ‘more vulnerable
and mistreated children to qualify for this form of legal relief.’”) (citation omitted).
366. See In re Amandeep S., No. G-1310/14, 993 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June
19, 2014). No evidence, however, supports such a causal link between the relaxation
of SIJS and the increased risk to unaccompanied immigrant children coming to the
United States.
367. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26.
368. See Adelson, supra note 17, at 83.
369. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354 (“In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”).
370. Adelson, supra note 17, at 83 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2006)).
371. See Report of the Working Group on Lessons of International Law, Norms,
and Practice, 6 NEV. L.J. 656, 657–58 (2006).
372. Porter, supra note 48, at 457–58.
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norms.373 The most relevant law relating to the welfare of children is
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).374 The United
States has stalled ratification of the CRC, and there are proponents
and deterrents of such ratification.375 However, courts are in a unique
position as political bodies in carrying out SIJS, which reflects a
compromise between ratification and CRC principles,376 as well as
representing the welfare of the children that cannot participate in the
political process that is required for ratification.377 Although the
United States has not ratified the CRC, signing the treaty obligates it
to refrain from enacting legislation that would undermine the CRC’s
objective.378 Particularly, Article 3 of the CRC provides that “in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.”379 The CRC and the CRC Committee directly
provide guidance for the treatment of unaccompanied and separated
children.380 The guidance heavily reflects the concepts of rights and
dignity in the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement and the focus
on family reunification, which one-parent SIJS embodies.381
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the one-parent SIJS interpretation. Congress
enacted SIJS in 1990 to give relief to child migrants who suffered
from abuse, neglect, and abandonment.382 The numbers of children
who are migrating to the United States recently have increased
Such a
unrelated to developments in immigration law.383
development highlights the importance of increasing access to rights
and legal relief, such as SIJS.384 After enactment of the TVPRA in
373. Dalrymple, supra note 315, at 142.
374. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354.
375. Wexler, supra note 331, at 565.
376. See id. at 574.
377. As a result, children are in need of state protection. See Dalrymple, supra
note 315, at 149.
378. See Wexler, supra note 331, at 565.
379. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354; see also Wexler, supra
note 331, at 566.
380. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354; U.N. Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 351.
381. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354; U.N. Comm. on
the Rights of the Child, supra note 351.
382. See supra Part I.A.
383. See supra Part I.E.
384. See supra Part I.E.
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2008, the common understanding of the improved language was that
one-parent SIJS cases would qualify.385 However, the introduction of
decisions by New Jersey and Nebraska courts complicated this
common understanding.386 Yet, the text of the statute clearly supports
the idea that children should be able to reunify with one of their
parents if they have experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment in
the hands of the other.387
The statute’s legislative history supports the idea behind the oneparent SIJS interpretation, and reflects a larger paradigm that gives
children more dignity, respect, personhood, and human rights.388
Allowing the one-parent SIJS cases to qualify not only has great
implications in terms of giving more children access to rights that they
deserve, it also helps highlight the importance and respect that the
United States has so far given to the international human rights
system.389 Family law and juvenile court judges are not gatekeepers of
our country’s borders, but are individuals concerned with the child’s
permanence and welfare.

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.A., II.C.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.

